TEHRAN – The understandings announced between Lebanon and the Israeli regime in April and June raise an analytical question that extends beyond their immediate political significance to their underlying legal structure.

These texts reveal the adoption of a familiar approach to resolving Arab-Israeli conflicts under U.S. sponsorship, one based on gradual security arrangements, restrictions on the sovereignty and operational scope of the Arab side, while preserving broad freedom of action for the Israeli regime. This is why comparing these understandings with the Oslo Accords between the Palestinian Authority and Israel is particularly significant. 

Structurally, the understandings made by the Lebanese authorities with the Zionist regime establish a transitional phase that postpones Lebanon’s sovereign demands and delays a final settlement to later stages, exactly what happened in Oslo.

Under Oslo, the process moved from a declaration of principles to detailed arrangements without resolving the core issues such as al-Quds (Jerusalem), Palestinian borders, and the return of refugees.

Likewise, in Lebanon, talk has focused on initiating a ceasefire or temporary truce, then creating transitional arrangements, and deferring final solutions to later negotiations. This means postponing the issue of Israeli forces’ withdrawal from Lebanon, the return of residents to their cities and villages, freedom of captives, and other fundamental concerns. The decisive element in both cases is the priority of the Israeli regime’s security.

Under the Oslo Accords, a security coordination system was established: the Palestinian side was obligated to control resistance factions and prevent them from attacking Israel.

However, the Zionist regime retained the freedom to intervene militarily whenever it wished, as well as the freedom of incursion and bombardment. 

The task of Palestinian security forces was to maintain internal order, control weapons, coordinate with the occupying regime, and arrest resistance fighters or prevent them from waging resistance against Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF). Israel, however, could intervene directly whenever it perceived an alleged threat.

Palestinian forces were not permitted to defend themselves against the IOF, or function as a sovereign military force; when the IOF entered an area, Palestinian security forces must either withdraw from the streets or return to their posts.

Under the current Lebanese understandings, Lebanon is committed to having the Lebanese Army prevent any resistance operations against Israel and dismantle resistance movements, while the IOF retains the right to “freedom of movement within Lebanon” and the right to “self-defense at any time,” as stated in the April declaration.

The April statement imposes obligations solely on the Lebanese side while explicitly granting the IOF the right to take “all necessary measures for self-defense,” including in “planned, imminent, or ongoing situations.” This clause, in its broad formulation, constitutes an open legal basis allowing Israel to bomb Lebanon and kill preemptively without an apparent threat.

Since the June statement contains no explicit provision revoking or restricting Israel’s “right of self-defense” as defined in the April declaration, and does not grant Lebanon a corresponding right or establish a clear legal contradiction, this means the previous text remains in effect.

In legal doctrine, this principle is known as the “continuity of obligations,” under which successive texts are read as a unified clause rather than separate legal documents. As a result, silence in a later text does not invalidate an earlier provision but is interpreted as implicit retention of prior arrangements unless stated otherwise. This makes the Israeli regime’s right to attack Lebanon whenever it wishes, even if not mentioned in the June statement, legally valid and embedded in the agreement’s overall structure.

The phrase “pilot zones” contained in the June statement bears a clear functional resemblance to the geographical division established under the Oslo Accords through Areas A, B, and C. 

In the Palestinian case, this division was presented as a temporary arrangement aimed at gradually transferring authority to the Palestinians. In practice, however, the reality that emerged differed substantially from what the agreements had stipulated.

In Area A, which was supposed to fall under full Palestinian civil and security control, daily administration remained with the Palestinian Authority. Nevertheless, repeated IOF raids and arrests continued, effectively stripping the notion of “full control” of its practical security meaning.

Area B, designated for Palestinian civil administration with joint security coordination, likewise witnessed clear Israeli superiority in security matters. The IOF retained the freedom to enter and exercise control whenever it liked, significantly limiting Palestinian authority in practice.

In Area C, which was assumed to gradually transfer to Palestinian control, full IOF presence continued, civil and military, with significant settlement expansion and strict restrictions on Palestinian construction and land use, including demolishing facilities under the pretext of lacking permits.

It consolidated Israeli control over what is defined by the United Nations today as the occupation of the entire West Bank, potentially on the verge of annexation. 

This experience demonstrates how a geographically divided transitional arrangement can transform into a permanent structure that reproduces existing power imbalances rather than modifying them. For this reason, the concept of “pilot zones” in Lebanon resembles the reality of the West Bank, where territory is gradually absorbed by the occupying power day by day.

Lebanese authorities are blindly creating conditions that would ultimately facilitate indefinite occupation and eventually formal annexation of southern Lebanon.